Informatica

Signcryption integrates both signature and encryption schemes into single scheme to ensure both content unforgeability (authentication) and message confidentiality while reducing computational complexity. Typically, both signers (senders) and decrypters (receivers) in a signcryption scheme belong to the same public-key systems. When signers and decrypters in a signcryption scheme belong to heterogeneous public-key systems, this scheme is called a hybrid signcryption scheme which provides more elastic usage than typical signcryption schemes. In recent years, a new kind of attack, named side-channel attack, allows adversaries to learn a portion of the secret keys used in cryptographic algorithms. To resist such an attack, leakage-resilient cryptography has been widely discussed and studied while a large number of leakage-resilient schemes have been proposed. Also, numerous hybrid signcryption schemes under heterogeneous public-key systems were proposed, but none of them possesses leakage-resilient property. In this paper, we propose the first hybrid signcryption scheme with leakage resilience, called leakage-resilient hybrid signcryption scheme, in heterogeneous public-key systems (LR-HSC-HPKS). Security proofs are demonstrated to show that the proposed scheme provides both authentication and confidentiality against two types of adversaries in heterogeneous public-key systems.

Due to the popularity of mobile communication, many computing devices are exposed to remote environments without physical protection so that these devices easily suffer from leakage attacks (e.g., side-channel attacks). Under such leakage attacks, when a computing device performs some cryptographic algorithm, an adversary may acquire partial bits of secret keys participated in this cryptographic algorithm. To resist leakage attacks, researchers offer leakage-resilient cryptography as a solution. A signcryption scheme combines signing and encrypting processes to simultaneously provide both authentication and confidentiality, which is an important cryptographic primitive. Indeed, many leakage-resilient signcryption schemes under various public key system (PKS) settings were proposed. Unfortunately, these schemes still have two shortcomings, namely, bounded leakage resilience and conditionally continuous leakage resilience. In this paper, a “fully” continuous leakage-resilient certificate-based signcryption (FCLR-CBSC) scheme is proposed. Security analysis is formally proved to show that our scheme possesses both authentication and confidentiality against two types of adversaries in the certificate-based PKS setting. Performance analysis and simulation experience show that our scheme is suited to run on both a PC and a mobile device.

Recently, Tzeng proposed a provably secure and fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol. It requires only a constant number of rounds to establish a conference key among all honest participants. This article will show that Tzeng’s protocol does not offer forward secrecy. We say that a conference-key agreement protocol offers forward secrecy if the long-term secret key of any participant is compromised and will not result in the compromise of the previously established conference keys. This property is important and has been included in most key agreement protocols and standards. In this paper, an improvement based on Tzeng’s protocol is proposed and it achieves forward secrecy. Under the Diffie–Hellman decision problem assumption and the random oracle model, we show that the proposed protocol can withstand passive attacks and is secure against impersonator’s attacks. The improved protocol requires a constant number of rounds to compute a conference key. The improved protocol provides fault-tolerance.

To resolve both certificate management and key escrow problems, a certificateless public-key system (CLPKS) has been proposed. However, a CLPKS setting must provide a revocation mechanism to revoke compromised users. Thus, a revocable certificateless public-key system (RCLPKS) was presented to address the revocation issue and, in such a system, the key generation centre (KGC) is responsible to run this revocation functionality. Furthermore, a RCLPKS setting with an outsourced revocation authority (ORA), named RCLPKS-ORA setting, was proposed to employ the ORA to alleviate the KGC’s computational burden. Very recently it was noticed that adversaries may adopt side-channel attacks to threaten these existing conventional public-key systems (including CLPKS, RCLPKS and RCLPKS-ORA). Fortunately, leakage-resilient cryptography offers a solution to resist such attacks. In this article, the first leakage-resilient revocable certificateless encryption scheme with an ORA, termed LR-RCLE-ORA scheme, is proposed. The proposed scheme is formally shown to be semantically secure against three types of adversaries in the RCLPKS and RCLPKS-ORA settings while resisting side-channel attacks. In the proposed scheme, adversaries are allowed to continually extract partial ingredients of secret keys participated in various computational algorithms of the proposed scheme while retaining its security.

Very recently, side-channel attacks have threatened all traditional cryptographic schemes. Typically, in traditional cryptography, private/secret keys are assumed to be completely hidden to adversaries. However, by side-channel attacks, an adversary may extract fractional content of these private/secret keys. To resist side-channel attacks, leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure. Identity-based public-key system (ID-PKS) is an attractive public-key setting. ID-PKS settings not only discard the certificate requirement, but also remove the construction of the public-key infrastructure. For solving the user revocation problem in ID-PKS settings, revocable ID-PKS (RID-PKS) setting has attracted significant attention. Numerous cryptographic schemes based on RID-PKS settings have been proposed. However, under RID-PKS settings, no leakage-resilient signature or encryption scheme is proposed. In this article, we present the first leakage-resilient revocable ID-based signature (LR-RIBS) scheme with cloud revocation authority (CRA) under the continual leakage model. Also, a new adversary model of LR-RIBS schemes with CRA is defined. Under this new adversary model, security analysis is made to demonstrate that our LR-RIBS scheme with CRA is provably secure in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model. Finally, performance analysis is made to demonstrate that our scheme is suitable for mobile devices.

Certificate-based cryptography (CB-PKC) is an attractive public key setting, which reduces the complexity of public key infrastructure in traditional public key settings and resolves the key escrow problem in ID-based public key settings. In the past, a large number of certificate-based signature and encryption schemes were proposed. Nevertheless, the security assumptions of these schemes are mainly relied on the difficulties of the discrete logarithm and factorization problems. Unfortunately, both problems will be resolved when quantum computers come true in the future. Public key cryptography from lattices is one of the important candidates for post-quantum cryptography. However, there is little work on certificate-based cryptography from lattices. In the paper, we propose a new and efficient certificate-based signature (CBS) scheme from lattices. Under the short integer solution (SIS) assumption from lattices, the proposed CBS scheme is shown to be existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks. Performance comparisons are made to demonstrate that the proposed CBS scheme from lattices is better than the previous lattice-based CBS scheme in terms of private key size and signature size.

The previous adversary models of public key cryptography usually have a nature assumption that permanent/temporary secret (private) keys must be kept safely and internal secret states are not leaked to an adversary. However, in practice, it is difficult to keep away from all possible kinds of leakage on these secret data due to a new kind of threat, called “side-channel attacks”. By side-channel attacks, an adversary could obtain partial information of these secret data so that some existing adversary models could be insufficient. Indeed, the study of leakage-resilient cryptography resistant to side-channel attacks has received significant attention recently. Up to date, no work has been done on the design of leakage-resilient certificateless key encapsulation (LR-CL-KE) or public key encryption (LR-CL-PKE) schemes under the continual leakage model. In this article, we propose the first LR-CL-KE scheme under the continual leakage model. Moreover, in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we formally prove that the proposed LR-CL-KE scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries.

ID-based cryptographic protocol is an extremely valuable apparatus in the field of cryptography and has numerous latent applications. The safety of conventional ID-based cryptographic protocol is entirely contingent in light of the safety of private keys. Revelation of private keys needs reissuing all beforehand doled out encryptions. This confinement turns out to be clearer today as key presentation is more regular with expanding utilization of unprotected gadgets and mobile technology. In this context, relieving the loss of key disclosure in ID-based cryptographic protocol is a critical issue. To manage this issue, we present to include onward security into ID-based cryptographic protocol. Besides, we propose another development of indistinguishability-ID-based cryptographic protocol using Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) and Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem (GDLP) which is semantically protected against Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) in random oracle. We show that our presented protocol beats the other standing protocol as far as security, the length of public key and computational cost are concerned. We shed light on some applications and future scope.

To provide better overall performance, identity (ID)-based signcryption (IBSC) has been constructed by combining ID-based signature (IBS) and ID-based encryption (IBE) in a secure manner. Undoubtedly, the IBSC fulfills the authentication and the confidentiality by signature and encryption, respectively. All the previously proposed IBSC schemes are inseparable in the sense that the two-layer sign-then-encrypt procedure must be performed only by the same entity. However, the entities, such as wireless sensors and smart cards, are resource-constrained and become time consuming in executing the two-layer sign-then-encrypt procedure. Nowadays, the usage of mobile cloud computing is gaining expanding interest which provides scalable and virtualized services over the Internet or wireless networks while users with resource-constrained devices can enjoy the advantages of mobile cloud computing environments. Hence, we aim to reduce the computational cost for resource-constrained devices by employing a third party. In this article, we present the first separable ID-based signcryption (SIBSC) scheme in which the signing and encrypting layers are performed by the device and a third party, respectively. Under the computation Diffie–Hellman (CDH) and bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed SIBSC scheme offers the provable security of authentication and confidentiality while retaining communication performance.

Certificateless short signature (CLSS) possesses the advantages of both certificateless signature and short signature. CLSS eliminates the certificate management in conventional signatures and solves the key escrow problem in ID-based signatures. In the meantime, due to its short signature length, CLSS reduces the bandwidth for communication so that it is suitable for some specific authentication applications requiring bandwidth-constrained communication environments. However, up to now, there is no work on studying the revocation problem in existing CLSS schemes. In this article, we address the revocation problem and propose the first revocable certificateless short signature (RCLSS) scheme. Based on the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption, we demonstrate that our RCLSS scheme possesses strong unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under an accredited security model. It turns out that our scheme has the shortest signature length while retaining computational efficiency. Thus, the proposed RCLSS scheme is well suited for low-bandwidth communication environments. Finally, we combine the proposed RCLSS scheme with cloud revocation authority (CRA) to present a CRA-aided authentication scheme with period-limited privileges for mobile multi-server environment.