Volume 31, Issue 3 (2020), pp. 597–620
Very recently, side-channel attacks have threatened all traditional cryptographic schemes. Typically, in traditional cryptography, private/secret keys are assumed to be completely hidden to adversaries. However, by side-channel attacks, an adversary may extract fractional content of these private/secret keys. To resist side-channel attacks, leakage-resilient cryptography is a countermeasure. Identity-based public-key system (ID-PKS) is an attractive public-key setting. ID-PKS settings not only discard the certificate requirement, but also remove the construction of the public-key infrastructure. For solving the user revocation problem in ID-PKS settings, revocable ID-PKS (RID-PKS) setting has attracted significant attention. Numerous cryptographic schemes based on RID-PKS settings have been proposed. However, under RID-PKS settings, no leakage-resilient signature or encryption scheme is proposed. In this article, we present the first leakage-resilient revocable ID-based signature (LR-RIBS) scheme with cloud revocation authority (CRA) under the continual leakage model. Also, a new adversary model of LR-RIBS schemes with CRA is defined. Under this new adversary model, security analysis is made to demonstrate that our LR-RIBS scheme with CRA is provably secure in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model. Finally, performance analysis is made to demonstrate that our scheme is suitable for mobile devices.
Pub. online:1 Jan 2014Type:Research ArticleOpen Access
Volume 25, Issue 3 (2014), pp. 505–521
Up to date, a large number of ID-based signature (IBS) schemes based on bilinear pairings have been proposed. Most of these IBS schemes possess existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks, among which some offer strong unforgeability. An IBS scheme is said to be strongly unforgeable if it possesses existential unforgeability and an adversary who is given signatures of the IBS scheme on some message m is unable to generate a new signature on m. Strong unforgeable IBS schemes can be used to construct many important ID-based cryptographic schemes. However, the existing strongly unforgeable IBS schemes lack efficiency for the signature size and the computation cost of verification phase. In this paper, we propose an efficient strongly unforgeable IBS scheme without random oracles. Under the computational Diffie–Hellman and collision resistant hash assumptions, we demonstrate that the proposed IBS scheme possesses strong unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks. When compared with previously proposed strongly unforgeable IBS schemes, our scheme has better performance in terms of signature size and computation cost.