Informatica

The risk analysis has always been one of the essential procedures for any areas. The majority of security incidents occur because of ignoring risks or their inaccurate assessment. It is especially dangerous for critical infrastructures. Thus, the article is devoted to the description of the developed model of risk assessment for the essential infrastructures. The goal of the model is to provide a reliable method for multifaceted risk assessment of information infrastructure. The purpose of the article is to present a developed model based on integrated MCDM approaches that allow to correctly assess the risks of the critical information infrastructures.

We revisit the password-based group key exchange protocol due to Lee et al. (2004), which carries a claimed proof of security in the Bresson et al. model under the intractability of the Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem (DDH) and Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) problem. We reveal a previously unpublished flaw in the protocol and its proof, whereby we demonstrate that the protocol violates the definition of security in the model. To provide a better insight into the protocol and proof failures, we present a fixed protocol. We hope our analysis will enable similar mistakes to be avoided in the future. We also revisit protocol 4 of Song and Kim (2000), and reveal a previously unpublished flaw in the protocol (i.e., a reflection attack).

We know the necessity for information security becomes more widespread in these days, especially for hardware-based implementations such as smart cards chips for wireless applications and cryptographic accelerators. Fast modular exponentiation algorithms are often considered of practical significance in public-key cryptosystems. The RSA cryptosystem is one of the most widely used technologies for achieving information security. The main task of the encryption and decryption engine of RSA cryptosystem is to compute M^E mod N. Because the bit-length of the numbers M, E, and N would be about 512 to 1024 bits now, the computations for RSA cryptosystem are time-consuming. In this paper, an efficient technique for parallel computation of the modular exponentiation is proposed and our algorithm can reduce time complexity. We can have the speedup ratio as 1.06 or even 2.75 if the proposed technique is used. In Savas–Tenca–Koc algorithm, they design a multiplier with an insignificant increase in chip area (about 2.8%) and no increase in time delay. Our proposed technique is faster than Savas–Tenca–Koc algorithm in time complexity and improves efficiency for RSA cryptosystem.