Cryptanalysis of Nonrepudiable Threshold Proxy Signature Schemes with Known Signers
Volume 14, Issue 2 (2003), pp. 205–212
Pub. online: 1 January 2003
Type: Research Article
Received
1 November 2002
1 November 2002
Published
1 January 2003
1 January 2003
Abstract
Sun's nonrepudiation threshold proxy signature scheme is not secure against the collusion attack. In order to guard against the attack, Hwang et al. proposed another threshold proxy signature scheme. However, a new attack is proposed to work on both Hwang et al.'s and Sun's schemes. By executing this attack, one proxy signer and the original signer can forge any valid proxy signature. Therefore, both Hwang et al.'s scheme and Sun's scheme were insecure.