DiReCT Voting: Dispute Resolution with Cast Timeliness
Pub. online: 6 January 2026
Type: Research Article
Open Access
Open Access
Received
1 June 2025
1 June 2025
Accepted
1 December 2025
1 December 2025
Published
6 January 2026
6 January 2026
Abstract
Verification in modern e-voting protocols allows voters and the general public to independently confirm the elections results. However, verification alone is insufficient to hold entities accountable for misconduct, or to protect honest participants from false accusations. This limitation is especially critical in voting protocols with multiple authorities, where the ability to identify the specific misbehaving entity is essential. We present DiReCT, the first multiparty protocol that integrates dispute resolution with individual accountability. Our protocol addresses two previously unresolved disputes: authorities blocking access to the election; and authorities denying the casting of a ballot. In addition, DiReCT improves timeliness, allowing misconducts to be proactively detected during the elections. As a result, voters can identify and recover from attacks that prevent their ballots from being recorded. Notably, DiReCT achieves these capabilities with low trust assumptions on the authorities.
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