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<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">INFORMATICA</journal-id>
<journal-title-group><journal-title>Informatica</journal-title></journal-title-group>
<issn pub-type="epub">0868-4952</issn><issn pub-type="ppub">0868-4952</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name>VU</publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">INFO1051</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.15388/Informatica.2015.63</article-id>
<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
<subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
<title-group>
<article-title>A CCA2-Secure Multi-Decrypter Encryption Scheme Without Random Oracles</article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="Author">
<name><surname>Wang</surname><given-names>Shengbao</given-names></name><email xlink:href="mailto:shengbaowang@gmail.com">shengbaowang@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="j_INFORMATICA_aff_000"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="Author">
<name><surname>Zeng</surname><given-names>Peng</given-names></name><email xlink:href="mailto:pzeng@sei.ecnu.edu.cn">pzeng@sei.ecnu.edu.cn</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="j_INFORMATICA_aff_001"/><xref ref-type="corresp" rid="cor1">*</xref>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="Author">
<name><surname>Choo</surname><given-names>Kim-Kwang Raymond</given-names></name><email xlink:href="mailto:raymond.choo@fulbrightmail.org">raymond.choo@fulbrightmail.org</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="j_INFORMATICA_aff_002"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="Author">
<name><surname>Wang</surname><given-names>Hongbing</given-names></name><email xlink:href="mailto:florawang.2011@gmail.com">florawang.2011@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="j_INFORMATICA_aff_003"/>
</contrib>
<aff id="j_INFORMATICA_aff_000">School of Information Science and Engineering, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou 310012, PR China</aff>
<aff id="j_INFORMATICA_aff_001">Shanghai Key Laboratory of Trustworthy Computing, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200062, PR China</aff>
<aff id="j_INFORMATICA_aff_002">Information Assurance Research Group, Advanced Computing Research Centre, University of South Australia, Adelaide SA 5000, Australia</aff>
<aff id="j_INFORMATICA_aff_003">Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, PR China</aff>
</contrib-group>
<author-notes>
<corresp id="cor1"><label>*</label>Corresponding author</corresp>
</author-notes>
<pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>01</day><month>01</month><year>2015</year></pub-date><volume>26</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>543</fpage><lpage>556</lpage><history><date date-type="received"><day>01</day><month>08</month> <year>2013</year></date><date date-type="accepted"><day>01</day><month>03</month> <year>2014</year></date></history>
<permissions><copyright-statement>Vilnius University</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2015</copyright-year></permissions>
<abstract>
<p>In a multi-decrypter encryption (MDE) scheme, a message encrypted under the public keys of multiple receivers can be recovered only when all the receivers designated by the sender are available (e.g. in a national security setting where a “Top Secret” document can only be decrypted and recovered when all the designated “keyholders” present the respective keys). Despite its effectiveness (i.e. without heavy computational overheads) in ensuring a message can only be read when all the designated parties are available, this is an under-researched topic (there are only two published MDE schemes in the literature, to the best of our knowledge). In this paper, we propose an efficient MDE scheme and prove its CCA2 security in the standard model under the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption.</p>
</abstract>
<kwd-group>
<label>Keywords</label>
<kwd>multi-user cryptography</kwd>
<kwd>multi-decrypter encryption</kwd>
<kwd>bilinear pairing</kwd>
<kwd>chosen ciphertext security</kwd>
<kwd>decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption</kwd>
<kwd>standard model</kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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